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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In these consolidated cases of quiet title and trespass, a 
crucial issue is the location of certain boundary lines. 
Under the unique circumstances presented here, we 
conclude that the district court properly established the 
property lines in a bench trial before submission of the 
other issues to a jury. We also determine that the court did 
not err in its evaluation of the evidence and application of 
survey law. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's 
order as certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b). 
 
This litigation arises out of a long-standing dispute over 
ownership and boundaries of property located on the 
eastern end of the Island of St. John, United States Virgin 
Islands. After severing common issues from an action to 
quiet title and consolidating them with a trespass action, 
the district court in a bench trial resolved most of those 
points against defendants (various heirs and devisees) and 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff Newfound 
Management Corporation. Newfound Mgmt. Corp. v. Sewer, 
885 F.Supp. 727 (D.V.I. 1995). On stipulation of the 
parties, the order was certified as final within the terms of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 
 
The facts and disputes presented in this case are 
complex and multifarious. Indeed, the district court 
remarked in a pre-trial ruling: "As with all land disputes in 
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the Virgin Islands, this one involves a large cast of 
characters, hard feelings, and an often incomprehensible 
genealogy." To avoid complicating matters unnecessarily, 
we will recite only those facts essential to deciding the 
issues on appeal. 
 
Although litigation over the realty had taken place in 
earlier years, the matter before us began in 1980 as a 
probate action brought by persons claiming ownership of 
certain tracts of land as rightful heirs of the 19th-century 
owners. At stake were the title to and boundaries of parcels 
located in the Hansen Bay and Newfound Bay Estates in 
the East End Quarter of St. John.1 Included in the relief 
requested was the appointment of Eric Christian as 
Administrator of the Estate of James George Sewer, who 
would then bring an action to quiet title to the parcels. 
 
Christian filed the quiet title action on December 15, 
1987. Defendant Cedrick Lewis, as Administrator of the 
Estate of Bernard Williams, filed an answer in February 
1988. Newfound intervened as a defendant in December 
1988. 
 
On the eve of trial in December 1993, the parties agreed 
in general terms to a settlement. Seven months later, the 
court entered a detailed consent judgment in the quiet title 
action that resolved most issues, but left others for future 
determination. Over the objections of Newfound, the court 
directed that the adverse claims of Newfound, the Estate of 
Bernard Williams as represented by Lewis, and the heirs of 
Martin Sewer to parcels designated 6-P Hansen Bay and 
7-A Hansen Bay would be severed and consolidated for trial 
with the pending injunction/trespass action brought by 
Newfound on August 16, 1991. 
 
In that suit, Newfound had asked for an injunction, 
alleging that several individuals had repeatedly blocked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The colorful names given to the land date back, in part, to Danish 
Colonial times when the rural parts of the Virgin Islands were divided 
into large tracts for agricultural purposes called "Estates." Each 
"Estate" 
was given a distinctive name. Estates in close proximity to each other 
were grouped together and designated as "Quarters." Dudley v. Meyers, 
422 F.2d 1389, 1390 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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access to the land under development by Newfound and 
stopped construction work underway. Named as defendants 
were Lewis, the Sewer heirs, and unknown persons who 
had attempted to prevent development of the land. In 
addition to obstruction, which apparently occurred on 
parcel 6-O-1, Newfound charged defendants with 
vandalism, as well as threats of violence, trespass, slander 
of title, and interference with business relations. 
 
In his answer to Newfound's trespass action, Lewis 
disputed the boundary lines of parcel 6-P and neighboring 
parcels, including parcel 6-O-1, as drawn by Newfound's 
surveyor, H. Marvin Berning.2 The answer contained a jury 
demand and a request for affirmative relief in the nature of 
a judicial determination of the property's rightful owners. In 
addition, Lewis asked for damages. Two weeks later, in 
September 1991, the parties stipulated to the entry of a 
preliminary injunction. 
 
On June 14, 1994 (two weeks after entry of the consent 
judgment in the quiet title action), the district court 
approved a final pretrial order for the two cases. Noting that 
Newfound had objected to severance of its claims to parcels 
6-P and 7-A for consolidation with the trespass action, the 
order stated that "the quiet title portion of the action will be 
tried as a jury-waived action." 
 
The pretrial order set out the contentions of ownership of 
the various parcels. The parties stipulated that Newfound 
held record title to parcels 6-O, 6-O-1, 6-O-2, 6-Y, and 6-Z, 
and that none of the defendants had record title to those 
parcels. Essentially, Newfound claimed that parcels 6-O, 
6-O-1, and 6-O-2 were located as shown on the Berning 
survey to the north of 6-P. 
 
The defendants' claim to parcel 6-P was based on the 
consent judgment. Lewis and the Sewer heirs asserted that 
6-P was incorrectly shown on that survey and, instead, was 
located partially within the area that Newfound designated 
as 6-O, 6-O-1, and 6-O-2. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We have attached a rough sketch of the relevant parcels as drawn in 
the Berning survey. 
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The pretrial order also described Newfound's claim for 
damages based on the blocking of construction, and listed 
as exhibits newspaper articles containing the defendants' 
claims of ownership of the land. The order noted that Lewis 
was standing "by his demand for a jury trial on all 
questions of fact." Newfound, however, continued to assert 
that "the resolution of issues relating to the title and 
boundaries of the Property are questions for the trial judge 
to resolve," and that after these determinations, the 
plaintiffs' damages could be tried to the jury. 
 
On August 19, 1994, two months after approving the 
pretrial order, the district court struck some of the 
defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses. In their 
proposed amended answer, the Sewer heirs had asserted 
that they held undivided equitable interests in parcels 6-O, 
6-O-1, and 6-O-2. Similarly, Lewis had claimed an 
undivided interest in Longbay # 1 and sought to defend the 
trespass claim on that ground.3 See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts S 185 (1965) (title of defendant is a defense to 
trespass). 
 
Assessing the defendants' claims, the district court 
pointed out that in the Virgin Islands an action to 
determine "any right or claim to or interest in" real property 
will be time-barred "unless it shall appear that the plaintiff, 
his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or 
possessed of the property in question within twenty years 
before the commencement of the action." V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
5, SS 32, 31(1)(A) (1967). As the court noted, "defendants 
have failed to plead an essential element of their case -- 
that they or their predecessors in interest possessed the 
land within twenty years of their commencing this action." 
Accordingly, the affirmative defenses based on the 
defendants' claims of ownership to Longbay #1 were 
stricken. The order did not discuss the defendants' title to 
parcel 6-P, nor did it prevent them from arguing that the 
allegedly tortious conduct occurred within that parcel's 
boundaries. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Parcels 6-O, 6-O-1 and 6-O-2 are adjacent and comprise part of a 
larger parcel once known as Longbay #1. 
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The case came on for jury selection and trial on October 
3, 1994. Acknowledging that the proceeding was 
"essentially to determine whether or not an injunction 
should be issued," counsel for the Sewer heirs argued that 
there was no immediate harm and that Newfound had an 
adequate remedy at law. In addition, counsel contended 
that the jury should determine whether Newfound owned 
the land and whether defendants had trespassed. The court 
responded: "The jury will determine the trespass. The only 
issue I'm determining is whether or not the plaintiff owns 
the land on which the trespass allegedly occurred. .. . The 
Court now only has to decide the issue of permanency and 
that's what it will do." 
 
On March 27, 1995, the court issued an exhaustive and 
comprehensive opinion reviewing the extensive 
documentary evidence and testimony presented at the two- 
day trial. 885 F.Supp. 727 (D.V.I. 1995). The court 
determined title to all disputed properties except parcel 10 
and expressly located the boundaries of most of the other 
parcels. 
 
Rather than proceeding to the jury trial as originally 
planned, on October 3, 1996 the parties stipulated to the 
entry of a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). The 
following paraphrased provisions, inter alia, appeared in the 
Order Certifying Final Judgment: 
 
           - Defendants have title to parcel 6-P; 
 
           - By locating parcels 6-O, 6-O-1, 6-O-2, 6-F, 6-Y, and 
             6-Z, the court implicitly held that 6-P was not 
             located on any of those parcels; 
 
           - Defendants assert that the alleged trespass occurred 
             on parcel 6-P, which should have been plotted 
             where the court plotted 6-O, 6-O-1, 6-O-2, 6-F, 6-Y, 
             and 6-Z; 
 
           - If the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 
             "plaintiff would withdraw its tort claims against the 
             defendants and the defendants would relinquish to 
             the plaintiff their ownership interest in parcels 6-f 
             and 6-p." 
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The court thereupon certified the March 27, 1995 order 
as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). Lewis filed a timely 
notice of appeal, but the Sewer heirs did not.4 Lewis raises 
a number of issues in his brief that require us to examine 
the proper scope of our jurisdiction and the adequacy of the 
Rule 54(b) certification. 
 
I. 
 
We first consider whether we have appellate jurisdiction. 
Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
       action, . . . the court may direct the entry of afinal 
       judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
       claims . . . only upon an express determination that 
       there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
       direction for the entry of judgment. 
 
We explained the requirements for a proper Rule 54(b) 
certification in Sussex Drug Products v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 
F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1990). To qualify, the relevant order 
must first be a final judgment in the sense that it 
ultimately disposes of an individual claim brought as part 
of a multiple claim action. Id. at 1153. Second, an 
immediate appeal must foster efficiency and equitable 
concerns. Id. We review the former question de novo. Id. We 
review the decision to certify for an abuse of discretion. Id. 
 
Finality under Rule 54(b) is synonymous with that 
required under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Sussex Drug Prods., 920 
F.2d at 1153. If the order adjudicates the claim fully so that 
the court's only remaining task is to execute on the 
judgment, then the order will be considered final as to that 
particular claim within the multiclaim action. Id. at 1153- 
54. Partial adjudication of a single claim, however, is not 
appealable despite a Rule 54(b) certification. Id. at 1154; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Sewer heirs filed in our Court a motion to join as appellants, 
which was received by the clerk some 83 days after the Rule 54(b) order 
was entered. We denied the motion as untimely. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), 
4(a)(3), 4(a)(5). We will deny their motion for resuscitation for the same 
reasons. 
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see also Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368-70 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
As noted earlier, the parties have attempted to 
manipulate the finality requirement. According to 
paragraph 9 of the Rule 54(b) order, if, and only if, we 
uphold the findings entered on March 27, 1995, then 
Newfound will "withdraw its tort claims" in exchange for 
title to parcels 6-P and 6-F. This agreement was modified in 
a document entitled "Notice of Conditional Waiver of 
Damage Claims," filed in our Court by Newfound after oral 
argument. In this document, Newfound agreed to waive all 
damage claims asserted in the trespass action and agreed 
to relinquish its claim to Lewis' interest in 6-P if we 
affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for 
consideration of its request for a permanent injunction. 
 
We reject this maneuvering as a method of 
manufacturing finality because Newfound's offer to drop its 
tort claim is intrinsically contingent. As one Court has aptly 
held under similar circumstances: 
 
       Litigants and courts cannot, by agreement, avoid the 
       finality requirement of S 1291. While in this case the 
       parties have settled their dispute, the settlement is not 
       a final one, but a contingent one; if we affirm, the 
       parties will go their own ways, but if we reverse the 
       parties will continue to litigate the dispute. The fact 
       that the court of appeals could end the litigation does 
       not make a decision on a single issue final. True, 
       litigation will continue in cases where a court of 
       appeals reverses and remands a case, but in those 
       circumstances the lower court has already ruled on the 
       merits of the case. Here no decision on the merits has 
       occurred. 
 
Union Oil Co. of California v. John Brown, Inc., 121 F.3d 
305, 309 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotation and citation omitted); 
accord Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 
1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (parties cannot manufacture finality 
by stipulating to dismissal of outstanding claims without 
prejudice to reinstituting those claims if the Court of 
Appeals reverses the judgment on appeal); see generally 
Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 380-83 (3d Cir. 
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1996) (final judgment rule does not prevent appeal from 
otherwise unappealable order if plaintiff voluntarily and 
finally abandons all other live claims). Therefore, we must 
review the jurisdictional issue further. 
 
The partial consolidation of the quiet title and trespass 
actions presents complications. Consolidation orders tend 
to obscure questions of finality and practice under Rule 
54(b) because a factual determination may be conclusive in 
one claim but not in the other. See, e.g., Bergman v. 
Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 565-67 (3d Cir. 1988); Bogosian 
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1977); see 
also UGI Corp. v. Clark, 747 F.2d 893, 894 (3d Cir. 1984); 
see generally Gaylord A. Virden, Consolidation Under Rule 
42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The U.S. Courts 
of Appeals Disagree on Whether Consolidation Merges the 
Separate Cases and Whether the Cases Remain Separately 
Final for Purposes of Appeal, 141 F.R.D. 169 (1991) 
("Virden"). We apply a case by case-by-case approach to 
determine whether a judgment entered in one action may 
be considered final and appealable while a second action 
with which the first was consolidated remains pending in 
the district court. Bergman, 860 F.2d at 566. 
 
At this point, a brief review of the factual issues will be 
helpful in understanding the appealability question. The 
location of parcel 6-P is the crucial issue common to both 
suits and the essential point of disagreement between the 
parties. Parcel 6-P is bounded in part by parcel 6-O-1 on 
the north and by the George-Sewer line on the south. The 
parties do not disagree on the place on the ground where 
the obstruction incidents asserted by Newfound allegedly 
occurred, but heatedly contest whether that situs was 
located within parcel 6-P or 6-O-1. 
 
From the beginning, the parties have disputed the 
location of the George-Sewer line, so named because in 
1893 a Danish surveyor drew a line to separate the 
property of William George to the north (through whom 
Lewis and the Sewer heirs claim title) and Eve Marie Sewer 
to the south. The rudimentary and unspecific nature of the 
survey, coupled with the proliferation of George and Sewer 
heirs, has contributed substantially to this lengthy 
litigation. 
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According to Lewis, the eastern point of the relevant 
segment of the George-Sewer line is 600 feet further north 
than is shown on the Berning survey. If Lewis were correct, 
the northern boundary of parcel 6-P would lie on the land 
that Berning considered part of parcel 6-O-1 and would 
place the site where the alleged obstruction of construction 
occurred within parcel 6-P. 
 
Lewis has title to 6-P by virtue of the consent judgment 
in the quiet title action, and contends that he could not be 
a trespasser on his own land.5 Newfound claims that 
Berning properly located the George-Sewer line and, as a 
result, the trespass occurred on parcel 6-O-1. 
 
The district court located the George-Sewer line, 
including the segment running along the southern border 
of 6-P, as shown on the Berning survey. Thereafter, the 
court plotted the boundaries of parcel 6-O-1, including its 
southern boundary, which is common to the northern 
boundary of 6-P. By locating the George-Sewer line, the 
southern boundary of parcel 6-O-1, and the southern 
boundaries of the other parcels comprising the former 
Longbay #1, the district court, by necessary implication, 
located parcel 6-P (at least the disputed northern and 
southern boundaries) as shown on the Berning survey. 
 
Because the effect of the district court's findings was to 
negate his ownership defense to trespass, Lewis desired an 
appeal before proceeding to a jury trial. For Newfound, 
whose primary goal was to develop the land, resolution of 
the boundary dispute would determine whether a basis for 
permanent injunction existed. Therefore, in an effort to save 
the time and expense of another trial, as well as to receive 
prompt appellate review of the critical boundary 
determination, the parties entered into the court-approved 
Rule 54(b) stipulation. If the certification were dispositive, 
we could proceed to the merits without further ado, but as 
we stated in National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. City 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The pre-trial ruling, which Lewis did not challenge in his brief, 
prevents him from asserting title to parcel 6-0-1 in defense of trespass, 
and he may not defend on the theory that some unrelated person 
actually has title. Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts S 13 at 77 (5th ed. 
1984). 
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Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1994), "simply 
because a district court certifies a matter under Rule 54(b) 
does not automatically result in proper appellate 
jurisdiction." 
 
We agree with the district court that its findings with 
respect to parcel 6-P in the quiet title case are final and 
subject to appeal with a proper certification, even though 
that parcel remains to be surveyed. See 885 F. Supp. at 
771-72. For all practical purposes, title to 6-P and its 
boundaries have been adjudicated beyond realistic 
variance. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239, 
242-43 (9th Cir. 1978) (partition order that contemplated 
future proceedings, including a survey, was final 
nonetheless because it practically disposed of the parties' 
interests in the land) citing Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 
204-05 (1848). But see Calistro v. Kean, 389 F.2d 619, 620- 
22 (3d Cir. 1968) (determination of one boundary line in 
boundary dispute was not final because placement of other 
lines could have affected the first line's location). 
 
On the other hand, with respect to the trespass action, 
the court's order was not final because it disposed only of 
a boundary defense and did not adjudicate liability, 
damages or injunctive relief. In these circumstances, 
certification does not put the trespass case before us 
because the order lacks the requisite degree offinality. See 
generally Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 
(1976). Nevertheless, we have jurisdiction to consider 
whether the consolidation order prevented the district court 
from resolving disputes over 6-P in the quiet title suit 
before a jury would have addressed the same issues in the 
trespass action. That is an important facet of the case to 
which we shall turn. A challenge to the sequence of trial is 
fairly within the scope of the district court's order in the 
quiet title action which is properly before us. Accordingly, 
we have jurisdiction to consider Lewis' claim that a jury 
should have resolved the issues as to the location of parcel 
6-P.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We therefore need not decide whether this case is an appropriate 
occasion for the discretionary application of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction. See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 382 
(3d Cir. 1997); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 209 
(3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 
1988); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) (en 
banc). 
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 II. 
 
The parties hold widely divergent views on the role of the 
jury in this case. Lewis never demanded or asserted a right 
to trial by jury in the quiet title action -- he had no such 
entitlement. On the other hand, he at all times requested 
that a jury determine all the issues in the trespass action, 
including the boundaries of parcel 6-P. 
 
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 
Because the Virgin Islands is a territory, the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights do not apply to it except as expressly 
provided in the Revised Organic Act. The Revised Organic 
Act does incorporate the Seventh Amendment into Virgin 
Islands law. See 48 U.S.C. S 1561. We apply not only the 
text of the Amendment, but also the judicial gloss as 
developed over two centuries. 
 
The word "preserved" demands a historical inquiry to 
determine whether the suit, if filed in the English courts 
before 1791, would have fallen within the jurisdiction of law 
or equity. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 
(1830). Actions at law entitle the parties to a jury, but 
equitable cases do not. Whether a suit properly comes 
within the scope of equity has customarily depended on 
whether the plaintiff's remedy at law is adequate. This 
inquiry is the touchstone of Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 
506-07 (1959). 
 
When confronting a statutorily-created cause of action, 
courts must draw analogies to traditional common law 
suits in determining whether the case is within the 
jurisdiction of law or equity. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 
481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). This litigation, however, involves 
the tort of trespass to land, a cause of action well- 
recognized in 18th-century England. As such, we do not 
resort to analogies, but look for guidance to the history of 
those early suits, particularly those seeking injunctive 
relief. 
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The generally accepted modern rule is that equity has 
jurisdiction to grant relief against repeated trespasses on 
the theory that successive legal actions for monetary 
damages do not provide adequate relief. See 4 J. Pomeroy, 
Equity Jurisprudence S 1357 (5th ed. 1941). According to 
Pomeroy, "if repeated acts of wrong are done or threatened, 
although each of these acts, taken by itself, may not be 
destructive, and the legal remedy may therefore be 
adequate for each single act if it stood alone, then also the 
entire wrong will be prevented or stopped by injunction, on 
the ground of avoiding a repetition of similar actions . . . ." 
Id. at 964-65 (emphasis in original); see also Archer v. 
Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1914); 
Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 304-05 (1905); 
Pittsburg, S. & W. R. Co. v. Fiske, 123 F. 760, 761 (3d Cir. 
1903). 
 
Some early nineteenth-century American judges, 
however, believed that equity had no jurisdiction in 
trespass actions because the law provided adequate 
remedies. See Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns Ch. (N.Y.) 315, 336- 
37 (1823) (Kent, Ch.). Our research, however, does not 
support that conclusion. Several English courts, 
particularly those presided over by Chancellor Hardwicke 
and Lord Thurlow, granted injunctions in cases of 
continuing trespass. See Flamang's case, noted without 
citation in Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 306, 308 (1802) (Lord 
Eldon); Hamilton v. Worsefold, Register's Book, A. 1786 folio 
1 (Lord Thurlow), noted in Courthope v. Mapplesden, 10 
Ves. 290 (1804) (Lord Eldon); Coulson v. White , 3 Atk. 21 
(1743) (Hardwicke, Ch.); see generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr. 
and Roscoe Pound, Cases On Equitable Relief Against Torts 
(1933 ed.). 
 
It is in this context that Newfound argues that its 
trespass action, historically sounding in equity, does not 
entitle Lewis to a jury trial on all issues. Lewis' claim for 
damages does not change that result, Newfound contends, 
because once the chancellor assumes jurisdiction to grant 
an injunction, he has the power to award monetary relief 
against offending parties that is " `incidental to or 
intertwined with injunctive relief.' " Chauffeurs, Teamsters 
and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571 
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(1990), quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 
(1987). However, Newfound's agreement at pretrial to try 
most of the trespass issues, particularly damages, to a jury 
makes that theory of equity jurisdiction largely irrelevant. 
 
Lewis contends that this so-called "clean up" doctrine, 
giving equity the right to assess damages, is totally 
inapplicable. He argues that Beacon Theatres and Dairy 
Queen entitle him to have a jury trial in Newfound's 
trespass suit. 
 
In Beacon Theatres, plaintiff requested a declaratory 
judgment and defendant counterclaimed for antitrust 
damages. The trial court ruled that certain issues common 
to the plaintiff 's equitable claim and the defendant's 
counterclaim for damages be tried first to the bench. The 
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that such a procedure 
denied defendant a trial by jury of the issues raised in the 
counterclaim in violation of the Seventh Amendment. 359 
U.S. at 506-11. 
 
The Court reinforced the Beacon Theatres principle in 
Dairy Queen, by rejecting the notion that the "right to trial 
by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues 
are characterized as `incidental' to equitable issues." 369 
U.S. at 470. The Court noted that "[i]t would make no 
difference if the equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal 
cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole 
is equitable." Id. at 473 n.8. 
 
Finally, in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the 
Court summarized the holding of Beacon Theatres and 
Dairy Queen: 
 
       "where equitable and legal claims are joined in the 
       same action, there is a right to jury trial on the legal 
       claims which must not be infringed either by trying the 
       legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a 
       court trial of a common issue existing between the 
       claims." 
 
Id. at 537-38. 
 
These cases share the common theme in the references to 
procedural rules. In Beacon Theatres, Rule 13 authorized 
assertion of the legal counterclaim. In Dairy Queen, Rule 18 
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permitted joinder of all claims in one complaint. Thus, if 
the issues related to both the legal and equitable claims 
can be resolved in one lawsuit, then the right to a jury trial 
attendant to the legal claims will prevail. A contrary rule 
would eviscerate the right to a jury given the preclusive 
effect that would flow from the rulings in a prior bench 
trial. Avoiding such a result was the "major premise" of 
Beacon Theatres. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322, 333 (1979); see also Amoco Oil v. Torcomian, 722 F.2d 
1099, 1104 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
At first blush, therefore, it appears that Lewis' position is 
supported by applicable precedent. But significant 
distinctions exist that dictate otherwise. 
 The Beacon Theatres analysis applies when the legal and 
equitable claims are joined either in the same complaint, 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 
1190 (3d Cir. 1979), or in the same action through a 
complaint and counterclaim. Torcomian, 722 F.2d at 1104. 
Here, however, we are presented with consolidation of legal 
and equitable claims under Rule 42(a). Reevaluating 
equity's jurisdiction over legal issues in light of"the liberal 
joinder provisions of the Federal Rules which allow legal 
and equitable causes to be brought and resolved in one civil 
action," the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres referred 
specifically to Rules 1, 2, and 18 in a footnote. 359 U.S. at 
509 n.14. Conspicuous by its absence from this list was 
Rule 42 ("Consolidation; Separate Trials"). 
 
Although for purposes of appellate jurisdiction a 
consolidation order entered under Rule 42(a) may result in 
a single unit of litigation, the order entered here did not 
create a "single case" for jury trial purposes. When 
interpreting the predecessor to Rule 42(a), the Supreme 
Court stated that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of 
convenience and economy in administration, but does not 
merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of 
the parties . . . ." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 
479, 496-97 (1933). 
 
In Johnson, two suits brought by two separate groups of 
creditors sought a receivership of the same company. The 
Court held that attacks by plaintiff in the second suit on 
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the judge and receiver in the first suit were collateral, as 
opposed to direct, despite the order of consolidation. Id. at 
495-96. Johnson remains the "authoritative" statement on 
the law of consolidation. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d S 2382, at 430 (1995); see also 
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
735 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Virden, 141 F.R.D. at 
178. 
 
We followed the teachings of Johnson in Bradgate 
Associates v. Fellows, Read & Associates, 999 F.2d 745 (3d 
Cir. 1993). There, the district court had consolidated two 
lawsuits; one originally filed in federal court and the other 
removed to that forum. Finding an absence of diversity, the 
district court remanded both cases to the state court. Id. at 
748-49. We reversed and held that treating the 
consolidated cases as a single civil action would 
impermissibly enlarge the rights of one of the parties by 
affording it a state court trial in a case originally filed in 
federal court. As to that suit, dismissal was the proper 
disposition. By treating the actions as a single unit, the 
district court's order failed to respect the separate and 
distinct nature of the two lawsuits. Id. at 750-51. 
 
The teachings of Johnson and Bradgate  prevent Lewis' 
jury demand in the trespass action from extending to the 
quiet title portion of the case. To determine otherwise would 
allow the consolidation order without more to "merge the 
suits into a single controversy" contrary to prevailing 
precedent. 
 
We are not swayed in our conclusion by two cases 
decided after Johnson. Both approved a jury trial on 
common issues arising in consolidated cases when the right 
was appended to only one of the actions. Neither case cited 
Johnson. See Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d 
Cir. 1969); United States v. Nordbrock, 941 F.2d 947 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
 
In Blake, the district court ordered a jury trial where two 
suits had been consolidated. One case was for personal 
injury and the other was in admiralty seeking indemnity. Of 
course, the right to a jury trial did not apply to the 
admiralty action. The case is easily distinguishable because 
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the personal injury suit was filed first and was a necessary 
predicate to the indemnity suit. There, the factual issues 
were interdependent and both suits were based on the 
same incident. 
 
Nordbrock began with an equitable action brought by the 
Internal Revenue Service. After the trial, the court imposed 
a penalty assessment against defendant. He paid part and 
sued for a refund, demanding a jury trial. The cases were 
eventually consolidated and common issues tried to the 
bench. The Court of Appeals held that once the two cases 
were consolidated defendant became entitled to a jury trial 
on all issues. 941 F.2d at 949. We think Nordbrock is 
distinguishable on its facts and not applicable here.7 
 
The differences between these two cases and the case 
before us are significant. Unlike the typical Beacon Theatres 
scenario where the legal and equitable claims are filed 
contemporaneously (or close to it) and arise out of the same 
incident, the complaint in the quiet title action had been 
filed almost four years before Newfound's trespass action. 
In fact, the equitable case had been pending for years 
before the alleged obstruction incident occurred. Moreover, 
most of the claims in the quiet title action had been the 
subject of a consent judgment entered before the trespass 
case was even reached for pretrial. The post-consolidation 
bench trial that located parcel 6-P was simply a 
continuation of the quiet title trial. 
 
Had the quiet title action been tried to completion in the 
normal course of events, it would have resulted in a 
judgment clarifying the state of the titles and the location 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. One commentator contends that courts should treat consolidated 
cases as a single, civil action for most purposes. Joan Steinman, The 
Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What 
They Are, What They Might Be; Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction 
(Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. Rev. 717 (1995); Joan Steinman, 
The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: 
What They Are, What They Might Be; Part II: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 
42 UCLA L. Rev. 967 (1995). We are impressed with her efforts, 
particularly as applied to Rule 54(b), but believe that Johnson, Bradgate 
and Virden undermine the argument for creation of a single litigation 
unit after consolidation. 
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of parcel 6-P even before the trespass incident took place. 
Unfortunately, delays in disposition of litigation in the 
Virgin Islands at that time were not unusual, caused as 
they were by the lengthy period when the two resident 
judgeships went unfilled.8 
 
Furthermore, the only overlap of relevant issues between 
the two suits was the location of parcel 6-P. The bench trial 
did not address the other elements of the alleged trespass. 
This situation thus contrasts with the usual Beacon 
Theatres scenario where substantial factual overlaps occur. 
Given these circumstances, we do not believe that Beacon 
Theatres demands that the dispute over location of parcel 
6-P be tried to a jury first. 
 
In summary, we conclude that Beacon Theatres does not 
apply in these consolidated cases where the equitable 
action was filed long before the legal one, the trial was a 
continuation of the equity matter, the overlap of factual 
matters was not extensive, and inordinate delay had 
prevented timely completion of the equity case. Thus, the 
district court did not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment 
by resolving the factual dispute over the location of parcel 
6-P in a finding from the bench. 
 
III. 
 
Lewis complains that the court erred in accepting much 
of Berning's testimony because Berning was not licensed in 
1969 when he drafted some surveys, and because he did 
not follow approved survey practices. 
 
Berning testified that he performed survey work in the 
Virgin Islands from 1958 through 1974 as a duly licensed 
engineer. He then left the Islands. Upon returning some ten 
years later, Berning encountered a new requirement that 
forced him to take an examination to obtain a surveyor's 
license. He successfully passed the test and was issued a 
license. Berning had extensive experience in surveying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Judge Almeric Christian assumed Senior status on May 15, 1988. 
Judge David O'Brien died on December 22, 1989. Thefirst vacancy was 
not filled until June 30, 1992 when Judge Thomas Moore assumed 
office. The second was filled by Judge Raymond Finch on May 9, 1994. 
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activity on St. John. In addition, he had prepared an aerial 
survey of the East End and done personal research into 
documents of title in Denmark. Understandably, the 
defendants' counsel did not challenge Berning's 
qualifications as an expert at trial. 
 
Describing his surveying methods, Berning explained 
that when monuments or precise definitions of metes and 
bounds proved unhelpful, he would discuss boundaries 
with older residents and adjacent owners, or rely on such 
clues as fences or ridge lines. We are satisfied that the 
district court properly evaluated this procedure in 
appraising Berning's testimony. The fact that he had not 
been licensed as a surveyor by the Virgin Islands in 1969 
when drafting some of the surveys he referred to does not 
furnish a basis for discrediting Berning's testimony on 
those matters. 
 
IV. 
 
Lewis further contends that the district court erred in 
failing to apply proper survey law in determining the 
location of various parcels. Particularly, he finds fault with 
the court's acceptance of Berning's survey as to the location 
of the George-Sewer line that borders parcel 6-P on the 
south. 
 
As noted earlier, a Danish surveyor named Anderson 
established the line in 1893, using compass bearings and 
stone piles as markers. There were no pretensions that this 
represented a precise survey on the ground. Acreage was of 
little value at the time and would not have justified the 
expense of an accurate survey. The George and Sewer 
families memorialized their agreement to be bound by 
Anderson's survey in 1894. 
 
In the years following, the families' interests in the land 
were transferred through deed and inheritance. Still, 
imprecise boundary lines coupled with the increasing 
number of descendants made accurate conveyancing an 
ideal rather than a reality. Another agreement, intended to 
identify numbered land parcels, was reached in 1913 
among the defendants' ancestors. Like that reached in 
1894, this agreement did not refer to any detailed survey. 
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Lewis raises these points in attacking the Berning survey, 
which locates parcels with larger acreage than mentioned in 
the 1913 agreement. 
 
For example, Lewis contends that Newfound is not a 
bona fide owner of parcel 6-O because the deed from one of 
its earlier owners recited acreage of 7.25, but the 1913 
agreement apparently referred to the same tract as 
containing substantially less land. This theory is flawed, 
however, since the 1913 agreement never purported to rely 
on an accurate survey. Overall, we are not persuaded that 
the district judge failed to evaluate this evidence 
appropriately. 
 
Lewis also contends that the district court erred in 
accepting the Berning survey of the George-Sewer line in 
preference to that of Rudolph Galiber, an expert who 
testified on the defendants' behalf. For his location of the 
line, Galiber relied on a stone pile marker on the east side 
of the property and on Anderson's compass bearings when 
placing one end of the George-Sewer line several hundred 
feet farther north than located by Berning. 
 
We believe that the district court was justified in 
accepting Berning's location based on his greater familiarity 
with the area and more extensive work on the survey. 
Although Galiber had survey experience in various parts of 
the world, Berning was more familiar with the practice in 
St. John. He grappled with the problem of the George- 
Sewer line at length, while Galiber spent only eight hours 
on the question when preparing for trial. 
 
One can scarcely underestimate the difficulties involved 
in determining the state of titles and boundary locations in 
the absence of adequate surveys, probate proceedings, and 
appropriate monuments. The district court's review of the 
available documentary evidence and testimony was careful 
and painstaking. It applied appropriate legal principles and 
its findings are not clearly erroneous. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court. The case 
will be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The court shall 
entertain Newfound's request for a permanent injunction 
and direct prompt completion of the survey of parcels 6-P 
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and 7-A. The court shall give full effect to the parties' 
waiver of claims as set out in the district court's order of 
October 3, 1996 and Newfound's Notice of Conditional 
Waiver of Damage Claims dated July 3, 1997.9 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although jurisdiction over cases of this nature now resides in the 
territorial court, the district court retains jurisdiction here because 
the 
suits were filed before October 1, 1991, the effective date of V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 4, S 76(a) (Supp. 1997). See Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. v. Sharp 
Properties, 998 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1993).                                 
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